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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing is a newly emerging technology where storage, computation and services
are extensively shared among a large number of users through virtualization and distributed
computing. This technology makes the process of detecting the physical location or ownership of a particular piece of data even more complicated. As a result, improvements in
data provenance techniques became necessary. Provenance refers to the record describing
the origin and other historical information about a piece of data. An advanced data provenance system will give forensic investigators a transparent idea about the data’s lineage, and
help to resolve disputes over controversial pieces of data by providing digital evidence. In
this paper, the challenges of cloud architecture are identified, how this affects the existing
forensic analysis and provenance techniques is discussed, and a model for efficient provenance
collection and forensic analysis is proposed.
Keywords: data provenance, conceptual model, cloud architecture, digital forensic, digital
evidence, data confidentiality, forensic requirements, provenance challenges

1.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, advancement in data processing and communication technology and
theabundance of digital storage capacity enable coupling multiple computing resources
tomanage large amount of data. The concept of cloud computing was developed to offerthis computing power and storage as service virtually. In such a utility-based businessmodel, a consumer can utilize the offered services on-demand following the ”payas-you-go”approach (Voorsluys, Broberg, &
∗
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Buyya, 2011). However, efficient data management must include some other parameters to maintain the quality of the data
and enable reusing it. Data provenance or
lineage is a form of metadata that stores
the origin of a piece of data, keeps track of
its ownership, and manages the history of
the computational processing the data goes
through in its lifetime. This data management technique is useful not only as a source
of data regeneration or as a component for
identifying errors through backward tracking, it also helps in regulatory purposes and
resolving disputes by facilitating a proper investigation in digital forensics. These asPage 47
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pects of provenance records make it an essential topic to be discussed in cloud architecture.
Clouds basically use the concept of multitenancy and virtualization to ensure efficient
utilization of available resources. It identifies and solves some challenges of large scale
data processing, such as on-demand resource
allocation based on computational requirements, distribution and coordination of jobs
among different machines, automatic recovery management, dynamic scaling of operations based on workloads, and releasing
the machines when all the jobs are complete (Amazon Web Services, 2008). These
features make cloud computing a popular
choice for small and medium scale industries, and research says this market will expand with a 30% CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) to reach 270 billion by
2020 (Market Research Media, 2016). As
cloud computing grows in popularity, so do
concerns about security, compliance, privacy
and legal matters (Chung & Hermans, 2010).
Storing data in a location with an unknown
owner’s record with thinner boundaries, and
backing up data by an untrusted third party
are a couple of the notable security concerns with cloud architecture (Hashizume,
Rosado, Fernández-Medina, & Fernandez,
2013). These issues can eventually affect the
trustworthiness of the data, as well as the
metadata associated with it, making it difficult to find accurate evidence to apply in
forensics. Though there are several digital
forensic tools to apply in general IT scenarios, most of them have failed to prove their
success over cloud architecture. Thus, new
digital forensic methods must be developed
to meet the challenges of a cloud architecture.
In this paper, a provenance model to increase the capability of digital forensics in a
cloud environment will be examined. While
this model can be experimented on other
Page 48

cloud deployment models, the public cloud
architecture will be the focus as it introduces
more challenges than the other models. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, basic concepts of public cloud, digital forensic and data provenance along with
their challenges and requirements will be discussed. In Section 3, previous work on related areas will be explored. In Section 4,
the proposed data provenance model will be
discussed along with additional design considerations. Finally, conclusions and future
work will be discussed in Section 5.

2.

BACKGROUND
2.1

Public Cloud

(Mell, Grance, et al., 2011) defined Cloud
computing as a “model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider
interaction.” With lots of services offered
through advanced technologies, cloud computing is redefining computing technology.
Its “pay-as-you-go” and “provision-as-yougo” make it the most suitable choice for
storing personal information, maintaining
shared documents with a large group of
users, and hosting large applications that
require higher computational power. As
cloud computing offers wide ranges of services based on demand from a single user to
a large organization, different service and deployment models have been designed. One of
the widely used deployment models of cloud
service is public cloud, which (Jansen &
Grance, 2011) describe as an “infrastructure
and computational resource” that is “owned
and operated by an outside party that delivers to the general public via multi-tenant
c 2018 ADFSL
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platform”. Figure-1 depicts a general architecture of the public cloud model where
cloud consumers are accessing the infrastructure of a cloud provider.
Figure 1. Public Cloud Model (Bohn et al.,
2011)
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2.1.1

Challenges

As its definition suggests, the public cloud
model is actually designed to offer individuals and enterprises the opportunity to minimize cost with on-demand infrastructure and
computation support in a shared environment. However, the shift of control over the
data and application to a different administrative entity raises some security and privacy concerns. A cloud provider’s reliable
and powerful infrastructure is often vulnerable to threats like media failures, malicious
attacks or software bugs. Their ability to
access a user’s data with malicious intention is another type of privacy issue found
in the public cloud model. (Ren, Wang, &
Wang, 2012) identified data owners’ inability to monitor and define the access control
policy and lack of control over the record relevant to cloud resource consumption as possible security challenges.
(Bohn et al., 2011) and (Ren et al., 2012)
considered hardware virtualization as another critical privacy and security issues.
Hardware virtualization leads to a multitenant architecture where the physical infrastructures are shared among multiple consumers with logically separated control over
c 2018 ADFSL
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the resources. An attacker might be able to
overcome this logical separation using configuration errors or software bugs to gain illegitimate access. Accessing services over the internet also increases vulnerabilities through
various network threats (Bohn et al., 2011).
When an organization manages its own resources and records in its secured computing
environment, it can clearly arrange the necessary protective measures and have a detailed idea about the location and structure
of the data. On the contrary, cloud computing services are dispersed and data is duplicated over multiple locations to ensure availability of the records. Cloud providers maintain this information solely to eliminate possible security breaches. However, the inability to locate the actual position of the data
is a major compliancy concern for an organization while exporting its business control
over to the cloud (Kandukuri, Rakshit, et
al., 2009).

2.2

Digital Forensics

With the expanding use of technological devices and widespread adoption of communication networks to share data, it has become necessary to develop technologies that
can store and examine records from different sources. Digital forensics is a logical
approach to identifying, collecting, and examining data while ensuring the integrity
and chain of custody is properly preserved
and maintained. (Kent, Chevalier, Grance,
& Dang, 2006) describe several applications
of digital forensics based on a variety of
data sources, such as investigating cybercrime and violations of internal policy, reconstructing security incidents, troubleshooting
operational problems and recovering from
system damage.
(Zawoad, Hasan, & Skjellum, 2015) provide an elaborate description of the steps of
the digital forensic process based on the formal definition. Figure-2 demonstrates the
Page 49
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digital forensic process flow. The identification process consists of two steps where the
incident and most relevant evidence are identified along with their possible correlation
with other incidents in the system. In the
collection step, all digital evidence related
to an incident is accumulated from different
sources, preserving their integrity. Later, the
records are properly organized by extracting
and investigating the data characteristics. In
the final stage, a well formulated document
is prepared by the investigator to present to
the court.
Figure 2. Process Flow of Digital Forensic
(Zawoad et al., 2015)

2.2.1

Challenges

Applying the digital forensic process in a
simple computing architecture is complex by
nature in and of itself; however, when a
cloud architecture is taken into consideration, the process becomes even more challenging. The distributed nature of cloud
infrastructure and some of its features affect the credibility of the collected artifacts
and eventually increase the complexity of the
forensic process in each of its steps.
(O’shaughnessy & Keane, 2013) illustrated some of the issues relevant to the
cloud forensic process while describing the
difference from the general approach of digital forensics based on the “Integrated Digital Investigation Process Model” of (Carrier,
Spafford, et al., 2003). Carrier illustrated
the relevance between digital and physical
investigation and described the digital investigation model with five phases – preservation, survey, search and collection, reconstruction and presentation. However,
Page 50

(Alqahtany, Clarke, Furnell, & Reich, 2015)
identified the challenges based on the general process model of forensics – identification, collection, organization and presentation. Forensic challenges in cloud computing
in this paper will be described referencing
both of these models.
Any digital investigation must begin with
the collection of the digital device to preserve
the artifact related to an occurrence. In
cloud computing, volatile memory of a virtual machine instance and the unavailability of the virtual images demands creation of
advanced technologies to preserve evidence.
Logs, the valuable container of evidence, are
maintained by the cloud providers, but integrity of this data might be affected by unlawful actions. A cloud environment also
imposes restrictions over the control of data
and relational information (e.g., location of
data) which reduces the opportunity of effective data preservation.
Once the necessary evidence is preserved
and ready for initial analysis to build a satisfactory theory, the incident identification
process can begin. (O’shaughnessy & Keane,
2013) described the effect of cloud service
models in this phase. In both Software as
a Service (SaaS) and Platform as a Service
(PaaS), the consumer has limited access to
the cloud infrastructure, which leaves the
investigator with a limited option to identify any occurrence directly in the server instance. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
provides better access than the other two
models as it allows the client to configure
their server with necessary logs. The different level of access in the different service models eventually hinders the process
of building a unified model for incident identification and documentation.
Data collection involves accumulating
data from different sources like storage devices, client’s browser history, client’s communication with the service provider and acc 2018 ADFSL
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cess information of the cloud and other network level data. Distributed cloud architectures introduce various challenges for the investigator in this phase. They require extensive knowledge of the cloud architecture,
data storage techniques, extraction mechanisms for preserving data integrity and maintaining privacy of cloud consumers. Also,
shared storage for managing the logging information for multiple enterprises raise concern for privacy concern if any incident needs
thorough investigation and require collecting the complete logging information. Data
collection also might be affected by integration of inefficient provenance techniques,
lack of time synchronization and inappropriate maintenance of the chain of custody.
Collected records are further used in a controlled environment to reconstruct an incident to solidify theory building in the reconstruction phase. This requires arranging
records from different sources in a unified
structure, identifying correlations between
different events to successfully recreate the
incident. Unavailability of proper forensic
tools and utility applications in a cloud environment introduces critical challenges in this
phase.
A successful forensic investigation ends
with the submission of a well-formulated
documentation of an incident in the court
with proper digital and physical artifacts to
defend the report. The distributed nature
of the cloud might require a detailed explanation for proper understanding by the
jury, location of data might introduce difficulty to determine the judicial boundary,
and sources and the data collection process
might be questioned for the lack of credibility; hence, all these issues need to be overcome during this phase.
2.2.2

Requirements

(Bohn et al., 2011), in their conceptual reference model of cloud architecture, mentioned
c 2018 ADFSL
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about five major cloud actors with their
defined responsibilities and offered services.
Figure 3 illustrates a cloud architecture focusing on the cloud actors, based on the
high-level architecture shown in (Bohn et al.,
2011). Each actor has sole or shared responsibilities to execute different business transactions or operations in a cloud environment.
In this scenario, cloud providers offer services which are negotiated by the brokers,
connected and transported by the carrier,
used by the cloud consumers and evaluated
independently for performance and security
by auditors.
Figure 3. Conceptual Architecture of Cloud
Cloud
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The contribution of these actors is later
used by (Ruan & Carthy, 2012) when discussing the different types of digital investigations. While an investigator is responsible
for the external investigations, cloud actors
play a vital role in the internal investigations
by taking various measures for security into
consideration. Based on the (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011) defined by Cloud Security Alliance, (Ruan & Carthy, 2012) presented a list of responsibilities of different
cloud actors in digital forensics. The responsibilities are identified as required criteria of
cloud forensics.
Ensuring data ownership with stewardship, data retention and disposal, data retention and disposal, facility security, clock synchronization, and integrating audit log and
intrusion detection are identified as the sole
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responsibilities of the cloud provider [23].
Data ownership with stewardship helps in
determining ownership of the records and
maintaining a chain in custody in the forensic investigation. With a proper backup facility and redundant data storage policy, the
provider can ensure successful data retention. Strict data disposal operations also
need to be integrated to ensure complete removal of data from all the sources without
leaving any option to recover them. Backups
are the only possible means of reconstructing
any event or incident.
Cloud providers also need to ensure
there are controlled access and authorization checks for any entry to the facility and
during data relocation to a different facility. In digital forensics, identifying events
in proper order helps in incident reconstruction. Cloud providers need to ensure that all
the processes are running under a synchronized environment. Integrating different logging functionality to record every single operation is another important responsibility
of cloud providers, which undoubtedly plays
the most vital role in digital forensic.
(Ruan & Carthy, 2012) also listed some
shared responsibilities of providers and consumers based on the (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011). Defining meaningful taxonomy, depending on data type, origin, legal or
contractual constraints and sensitivity, helps
in forensic investigations. All the important assets need to be recorded with ownership information, and different data-related
operations need to be logged with common
forensic related terms. For the purpose of facilitating regulatory, statutory and contractual requirements for compliance mapping,
elements might be assigned with legislative
domains and jurisdiction. Other shared responsibilities of the provider and consumer
include authorization, multi-factor authentication, establishment of policy and procedure as a part of incident management, and
Page 52

preservation of data and evidence integrity.

2.3

Data Provenance

Data provenance has proved its applicability and necessity in different application domains, data processing systems and representation models. For e-science, it can be
used for transformation and easy derivation
of data. In warehousing, it can be used to
analyze and represent data. For Service Oriented Architectures (SOA), it can be used
to execute complex computations. In document management and software development tools, it can be used to identify the
lifecycle of a document. As the nature of the
large range of applications differs, so does
their technique of managing the provenance
records.
Data provenance was classified in several
categories based on the techniques used to
trace the records and the way these are preserved. The techniques for data tracing are
classified under two approaches: “lazy” and
“eager” (W. C. Tan, 2004). In the “lazy”
approach, provenance records are computed
only when they are required, while provenance records are carried with the data in
the “eager” approach. Sequence-of-Delta
and Timestamping are two alternative approaches of archiving provenance records
(W. C. Tan, 2004). The Sequence-of-Delta
approach stores the reference version and a
sequence of forward or backward deltas between versions. On the other hand, timestamping uses versions and times to identify
data at various steps of its lifetime.
Provenance can also be discussed from
the points of the affect of the source
data on the existence of data records, or
the locations from which those records are
fetched (Buneman, Khanna, & Wang-Chiew,
2001). These concepts are termed as whyprovenance and where-provenance, respectively. From the aspect of data processing architecture, another classification was
c 2018 ADFSL
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proposed by (Simmhan, Plale, & Gannon,
2005). This approach was later adopted
by (Muniswamy-Reddy, Holland, Braun, &
Seltzer, 2006) and elaborated with more categories. They extend the database-oriented
approach of (Simmhan et al., 2005) to include a file and file-system oriented approach called Provenance Aware Storage
System (PASS). A grid-based solution comprises the service-oriented architecture in
which software-development tools are part of
a scripting-architecture. Environment architecture was the fourth category included by
(Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2006).
In a domain-specific approach of storing
provenance, data and provenance are loosely
coupled, as data is managed by the file system and provenance is stored in database
systems (Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2006).
Lineage File System (LinFS) used a third
party database to store provenance records
while able to track it at file system level automatically (Sar & Cao, 2005). The obvious issue with file and provenance separation was addressed in Flexible Image Transport System by (Wells, Greisen, & Harten,
1981) where the file header contains the additional attributes as a provenance record.
Another approach for tight coupling between data and provenance was later introduced in PASS. PASS tracks the provenance automatically like LinFS and manages its database directly into the kernel by
its file system PASTA (Muniswamy-Reddy
et al., 2006). PASS proved its superiority
by ensuring better synchronization between
data and provenance; it also provides security over the provenance and features to
query those records. File Provenance System (FiPS) is another provenance system
that collects provenance records automatically operating at the system level and below
the Virtual File System (VFS) layer (Sultana
& Bertino, 2013).
c 2018 ADFSL
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Challenges

Like digital forensics, the dynamic nature
of cloud computing and its architecture
introduces several challenges to establish
a successful provenance technique.
Researchers have highlighted heterogeneous architecture of cloud infrastructure, granularity , virtualization, availability and data integrity as the prime challenges while identifying a better provenance approach in
the cloud (Muniswamy-Reddy, Macko, &
Seltzer, 2010; Sakka, Defude, & Tellez, 2010;
Zhang, Kirchberg, Ko, & Lee, 2011; Katilu,
Franqueira, & Angelopoulou, 2015; Abbadi,
Lyle, et al., 2011).
(Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010) discovered the lack of extensibility of existing
provenance systems in the area of cloud computing and also their inability to support
availability and scalability as some of the
critical areas. Incompatible availability features between the provenance system and
the cloud architecture may affect the principle goal of provenance architecture. In addition, lack of scalability becomes clearly visible when a database is used to store provenance in the cloud architecture. This feature
makes provenance records query-able, but
in a distributed architecture, it introduces a
deadlock or scalability bottleneck. Introduction of a parallel distributed database, a possible solution to this problem, is often criticized because of its lack of maintainability
and cost.
(Sakka et al., 2010) highlighted challenging areas arise due to the variety in cloud
architecture. Difference in policies applied
by these architectures to identify objects
weaken the ability to establish a unique object identification technique in cloud. Also,
there is no efficient and unified architecture for an inter-operable provenance system
which could manage the heterogeneous policies followed by different entity and multiple
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level of granularity.
The virtualization feature of cloud architecture and its nature of fault tolerance also
imposes some technical issues in provenance
collection. (Zhang et al., 2011) discussed the
necessity of maintaining a record of operating systems, server locations and memory
management of virtual and physical environments to provide more accurate information to the consumers. They also prioritized
the maintenance of provenance information
about data migration which takes place in
case of hardware failure.
(Abbadi et al., 2011) presented taxonomy
of cloud infrastructures with a description
of the dynamic nature of this structure and
identified the challenges in the area of logging and auditing. It is imperative for a
system administrator to identify the location and reason of an error through auditing
and logging. But cloud’s multilayer architecture makes it difficult to identify the origin of data from humongous resources collected from a large number of diversified
sources. (Abbadi et al., 2011) defined the
role of the administrator in this scenario as
identifying the time intervals when physical
layers and virtual layers are used by the virtual resources and applications respectively,
and combining these records with other relevant log files. They also spotted some shortcomings like lack of protection in maintaining logging and auditing records and lack of
trustworthiness of the provider maintaining
the cloud infrastructure.
2.3.2

Requirements

In this section, requirements of data provenance will be discussed from two different aspects: the mandatory properties to fulfill the
general criteria of a provenance record and
the required features for a successful provenance technique in the cloud.
(Zhao, Bizer, Gil, Missier, & Sahoo, 2010)
categorized the requirement of provenance
Page 54

based on concerning areas such as content,
management and usage which are essential
for an effective resource description framework (RDF) model. They presented an elaborated discussion over each criterion. These
information include identity of the content,
evaluation of the content over the time,
records of processes or entities contributed in
its evaluation including justification and design choices behind the evaluation process.
From the management perspective of the
provenance records, a well-formatted representation language and the accessibility of
the provenance records are also considered
as important attributes.
(Moreau et al., 2011) also identified a similar set of integral components in their Open
Provenance Model (OPM). Basic information about an object, processes and agents
involved in its evaluation, interdependencies
between different entities, and actual role of
the agents are the most important tokens
of a provenance record. This information
later needs to be recorded in an easily representable language supported by heterogeneous systems and should allow customization to include additional information. Additionally, the recorded information should
be easily accessible with a simple query.
With the necessary attributes mentioned
above, provenance system also needs to follow some standards in terms of data maintenance, dependency on the associated application, level of granularity and data integrity
and presentation (Muniswamy-Reddy et al.,
2010; Katilu et al., 2015; Taha, Chaisiri, &
Ko, 2015; Y. S. Tan, Ko, & Holmes, 2013).
The data-coupling feature confirms the association between the data and provenance
records. Appropriate data coupling cancels
the chances of misleading data that might
contain new provenance information for old
data or vice-versa. This coupling must also
include the causal ordering among different
entities while recording the provenance inc 2018 ADFSL
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formation (Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010).
A provenance tracking system should enable tracking a particular object from every
host in a distributed environment, which is
an essential property to detect an incident
and ensure accountability across a system.
That way, if multiple host contribute in any
operation on an object, provenance records
should maintain record for each responsible hosts. A provenance system should also
be independent of the application and platform so that no additional configuration is
required to track if a new application is introduced in a system or if the kernel of a
system is modified (W. C. Tan, 2004).
Provenance system should strictly maintain the integrity of the records by making them temper-evident and ensure persistence of the record. Data integrity assure
the accuracy or correctness of the records
over time while temper-evidence confirms reliability, authenticity, admissibility, believeability and completeness (Taha et al., 2015).
On the other hand, persistence confirms the
existence of provenance information even
when the actual object is erased from the
system as long as the object has a descendant. The nature of provenance information
also demands confidentiality in every level
of data management e.g., data access, data
storage and data collection.
Capturing provenance records from multiple levels is also considered to be an essential property of a provenance system. Multilayer granularity provides complete scenario
of any incident occurred with an object in
different level of a system (Katilu et al.,
2015). An advanced interface to represent
the provenance record along with an efficient data retrieval technique is another
measure that defines the success of a provenance system. This sort of interface with
efficient query mechanism helps identifying any occurrence quickly and understand
patterns and characteristics of provenance
c 2018 ADFSL
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record (Katilu et al., 2015).

3.

RELATED WORKS

Digital provenance, in the cloud environment, has been studied for a long time in
order to meet the critical requirements imposed by the architecture and to mitigate the
challenges revolved around digital forensics.
Some researchers proposed different provenance techniques, while others have identified efficient approaches for effective forensic
solutions (Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010;
Zhang et al., 2011). Several techniques were
also proposed where provenance architecture
is specially discussed considering the requirements of digital forensic (Li, Chen, Huang,
& Wong, 2014; P. M. Trenwith & Venter,
2014; Lu, Lin, Liang, & Shen, 2010).
(Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010) extended
PASS for cloud architecture which was initially used in local file systems and network attached storage. They have implemented three provenance recording protocols using Amazon Web Service (AWS)
- single cloud storage, cloud storage with
cloud database, and cloud storage with cloud
database and messaging service based on
PASS. Cloud messaging service in the third
architecture ensured its superiority over the
other two by confirming provenance datacoupling through transaction and providing
the fastest service.
Cloud providers usually track every operation executed inside a cloud environment
to ensure immediate response to any incident. Flogger is such a logging mechanism
which can track file provenance both in virtual and physical machines (Ko, Jagadpramana, & Lee, 2011). DataPROVE, a data
provenance technique was proposed based
on records generated by Flogger in collaboration with other system monitoring tools
like User, Process, Event Tracker, Change
Tracker and Network Traffic Tracker (Zhang
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et al., 2011). It collects provenance information in the application layer service like
PaaS, SaaS and IaaS, rather than just virtual and physical machine information. It
also captures other cloud related essential
provenance information like client identification record and transfer of information
between different virtual and physical machines placed in different locations. Additionally, DataPROVE also provides efficient
data API for indexing and query operations.
S2Logger is another approach of maintaining secured data provenance through logging
at the block-level and file-level. It is implemented based on Flogger (Suen, Ko, Tan,
Jagadpramana, & Lee, 2013). In this mechanism, (Suen et al., 2013) addressed features
like capture mapping between virtual and
physical resources, proper maintenance of
the provenance chain and data integrity and
confidentiality. S2Logger also introduced an
end-to-end data tracing mechanism that is
capable of capturing detail provenance information from all nodes connected in the cloud
environment.
(Lu et al., 2010) have designed a provenance mechanism enabling the forensic features in the cloud environment. Provenance
was designed based on a bilinear pairing
technique considering some critical aspects
of cloud like data confidentiality, anonymous access of the user, and dispute resolution. This mechanism introduced computation and communication overhead at the
data owner’s end. This issue was later identified by (Li et al., 2014), and they have
introduced a broadcast encryption method
to overcome this. They have also ensured
anonymity of the user by implementing an
attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme for
access control and privacy by designing an
anonymous key-issuing protocol.
(P. M. Trenwith & Venter, 2014) discussed
another source of log information which may
allow the investigator to answer to the physPage 56

ical location of the data. They adopted a
provenance technique in their proposed system where transport layer protocol information was recorded to identify the location
of data. They also considered the application layer data to answer the additional
queries like who, when, what and how information which are required for a successful
forensic investigation. Provenance record is
proposed to be stored in a centralized logging server which eventually can overcome
the problem of strong coupling between data
and its meta data and can also ensure data
integrity. They proposed another model for
provenance with features like digital object
tracking and location identification at any
point of the lifetime of that particular digital object (P. Trenwith & Venter, 2015). In
this model, they introduced the concept of a
wrapper object which wrapped a file along
with its provenance records embedded together and the location of the wrapper object would be maintained in a separate centralized server.

4.

FORENSIC
ENABLED
PROVENANCE MODEL
4.1

Additional Design
Consideration

Designing an efficient and forensic enabled
provenance mechanism in a cloud environment requires that some other areas be considered which vastly contribute to the success of the process. Identifying the possible sources of provenance records, deciding
on a unified model to store those records,
data storage with required features for efficient data management, and ensuring security and integrity of the data for forensic
operations are important factors that must
be considered for a provenance mechanism.
c 2018 ADFSL
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General cloud architecture can be divided
into several layers – physical resource layer,
resource abstraction layer and service layer
as shown in Figure 4. (Ruan & Carthy,
2012) identified the sources of forensic artifacts from each of the layers. Among
these, it is necessary to identify the actual
sources which provide necessary provenance
related information and help in forensic analysis. Hard disks, network logs and access
records are important sources from the physical layer. Event logs and virtual resources
are necessary from the abstraction layer, and
access logs, events logs, rigid information
about the virtual operating system, and application logs are vital sources from the service layer. (Imran & Hlavacs, 2013) identified provenance information in different sublayers of the service layer and developed an
integrated provenance data collection process. In our conceptual model approach of
collecting provenance data, we will also consider the featured criteria used in these proposed systems which can be helpful for the
forensic process.

Figure 4.
Cloud System Architecture
([(Bohn et al., 2011)])

Service Layer
Saas

PaaS

IaaS

Resource Abstraction & Control Layer

Physical Resource Lay er
Hardware
Facility
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The format and properties for logging
provenance data collected from different
sources is important in a provenance collection system. (Marty, 2011) has identified
some important properties of provenance
data like timestamps, application, user, session id, category, and reason and severity
of the event. Applications running in the
service layer mostly contribute to this type
of information which can be collected from
different application and event logs. A distributed file system, like Google File System
(GFS), maintains a separate set of information vital for provenance and forensics. The
GFS master usually keeps information file
and chunk (part of a file) namespace, mapping from file to chunks, and location of the
replica of the chunks (Ghemawat, Gobioff, &
Leung, 2003). The Hadoop Distributed File
System (HDFS) also maintains a transaction
log, called EditLog, in its NameNode which
contains every modification recorded in file
system metadata (Borthakur et al., 2008).
Google cloud maintains region and zone related information while creating a virtual
machine instance recording which has provenance data along with other information
that may guide an investigator in forensic
analysis. The heterogeneous characteristics
of these records make the process of choosing a particular format very hard. Marty has
suggested a syntax of logging the information as “key-value” pair, which is considered
as an ideal syntax of logging information in
our design approach. We also include a unified naming approach of the “key” to ensure
synchronicity of the same properties coming
from different from sources.
Provenance data records must be easily searchable; therefore, a data repository
that can provide the best performance and
an efficient query interface must be chosen.
(Muniswamy-Reddy, 2006) explored different database architectures to choose the best
data repository. They considered aspects
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like the format of maintaining dependency
of the files and different approaches of storing the annotation metadata. They compared Berkley DB as a schemaless database,
MySQL as a RDBMS database, XMLDB as
XML database and OpenLDAP as a representative of an LDAP architecture and
found that Berkley DB outperformed other
database architectures in terms of standard database related operations in this scenario. While implementing PASS in cloud,
(Muniswamy-Reddy et al., 2010) also used
SimpleDB and Amazon S3 to store provenance objects.
Provenance records logged in different layers are basically maintained by different actors of the cloud. Cloud consumers are usually responsible for the records maintenance
service layer while providers manage the logging activities of the abstraction and physical layers. Provenance records in these layers may often be affected by the collusion
between the consumer and provider which
eventually can mislead the forensic investigator. The investigator can also play the role
of an accomplice with either of these parties,
which ultimately diminishes the whole approach of data provenance and forensic analysis. To ensure integrity of the provenance
data and trustworthiness of the collection
system, it is necessary to include a verification process which can be used to validate
the provenance information. (Zawoad et al.,
2015) proposed a Proof Publisher Method
(PPM) in their Open Cloud Forensic (OCF)
which can be used by the court authority to
verify the forensic reports provided by the
investigators. They also proposed a reliable
way of collecting the evidence through secured read-only APIs accessible only by the
investigator and court authority.

4.2

Proposed Model

Figure 5 shows the proposed Forensic Enabled Cloud Provenance Model. This secPage 58

tion will provide a description of the proposed model and surveys its requirements
of provenance, forensic analysis, and necessary design considerations. The concept of
the general actors of cloud operations and
forensic analysis have been utilized in this
model; however, the contribution of each of
the cloud actors and access mechanisms to
the provenance records for the investigator
and court authority have been redefined. It
is also necessary to introduce a unified logging mechanism in different layers of a cloud
environment to leverage data manipulation
while recording provenance information in a
persistent database.
Figure 5. Forensic Enabled Cloud Provenance Model

In a cloud model, consumers and providers
are the two main contributors to the cloud
operation, while a cloud auditor basically
performs analysis on the cloud services and
provides feedback. In the proposed model,
an additional responsibility for the cloud auditors is included. Usually cloud services like
SaaS and PaaS are designed to provide the
consumer with less control over the system
while IaaS allows configuring the necessary
applications. In these scenarios, a cloud auditor’s additional responsibility will be monitoring whether the services used by the consumers are capable of logging every operation or whether a provider enables the logging features for each application where the
consumer has limited access. The providers
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additional responsibility will be introducing
policies in SLA which will clearly instruct
the clients about installing necessary auditing features. The provider should also redesign the access policies so that the client
can have enough options for customization.
The provider should also be capable of monitoring every operation performed by the
client. In an ideal scenario, the provider
should install firewalls and other applications to detect intrusions or any form of malicious activity.
Database architecture is an important aspect of designing an ideal provenance model.
It is required not only to accommodate a
variety of information or manage large volumes of data, but also to ensure availability and scalability. Considering these facts,
the proposed system is a schema-less distributed database system to store the provenance record coming in heterogeneous format from different sources. The distributed
nature of the database architecture will ensure the availability and scalability features.
Data will be stored in a key-value format
where the key name will maintain a consistent naming convention to facilitate the
query operation maintained through a unified data modeling policy. Each transaction
will be logged separately with the reference
to the dependent object. Keeping a single
instance of the provenance record requires
updating the instance very frequently and
hence reduces the expected performance of
the system. In the case of recording provenance for a file, it is recommended that a
copy of the content that will be logged in
the repository be maintained. Provenance
record of a data should also maintain relationship information with the process or environment variables that effected it at any
point of its lifetime.
A timestamp with every transaction is a
vital field. Loggers in different layers will require maintaining strict synchronization of
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time to capture the sequence of events properly. To maintain proper chronology of the
data from different systems, each transaction
will be saved with timestamp information for
both the source and data storage system.
This will eventually help in identifying the
unsynchronized nodes or sources.
Trustworthy data storage policy is another
important concern. It is necessary to ensure integrity of the data and employ techniques to easily identify any forged data and
possible miscreants. To ensure this, the
database should be designed for capturing
necessary audit information. Audit information will include the application or user identity which eventually stores or update any
information. For all of the data that will be
saved an additional attribute will be added
as provenance. This attribute will contain
the hash value of the data item. This hashed
data will be used later for verification of the
information.
If any issue is reported by any of the other
three actors of cloud services, the process of
forensic analysis starts. In this case, an investigator will conduct the preliminary investigation by collecting provenance records
from the provenance storage and finally prepare a report eligible for submission to the
court authority. The court authority will
verify the report and provide the verdict. To
facilitate this process, query and verification
interfaces for the investigator and court authority have been introduced in the proposed
system. These services will be provided by
the service providers.

4.3

Discussion

This section briefly demonstrates how the
proposed model of provenance collection
overcomes the challenges already discussed
in Section 2 and how efficiently this model
can facilitate the process of forensic analysis. In table-1, we also present a comparative analysis with the existing approaches in
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terms of the challenges of provenance management for forensic analysis in public cloud
addressed by those models.
One of the primary concerns about cloud
computing is the shift of control of data or
files to a different authority. Data might be
affected by malicious attacks, software bugs
or system failure. The distributed nature of
cloud architecture can ensure availability of
data in these scenarios. Any unlawful access
from a provider’s end can be easily identified
through the provenance information, as every access to any file or data is recorded by
the provenance system.
Allowing multi-tenant facility through virtualization and identifying the location is the
most notable challenge in a public cloud environment. Collecting snapshots of virtual
machine logs with additional information to
identify the virtual machine instance can
solve this problem. File system metadata
contains details about the file status and location. Integrating necessary measures already discussed in 4.1 can lead to an efficient
solution to these issues. Maintaining provenance records with location information will
eventually help investigators identifying the
location of an object and collect necessary
artifacts accordingly.
Forensic investigation is often hampered
because of the lack of synchronization between stored records and variations of
records coming from different sources. In the
proposed model, a unified model to identify
attributes of the entity and relevant operations is introduced. This will facilitate the
process of analysis as investigators can easily
identify and differentiate between entities of
a particular piece of information and their
effect on the provenance record or forensic
analysis.
Managing the large collection of provenance data is a difficult job. The large
volume of information, variety in data formats and increase in volume in high velocPage 60

ity make the provenance collection process
a highly challenging task. To ensure efficient forensic analysis, a provenance collection technique can compromise none of these
concerns. Hence, it is recommended to ensure a better data management policy. The
proposed model suggests a unified naming
convention for “keys” coming from different
sources. A well-chosen naming conversion
helps to identify the exact information in
search and can also identify relations in log
information coming from different sources.
Regeneration of data or an incident from
the lineage information is another focus
of a data provenance system. Provenance
records maintained with the actual content
can ease this process as an investigator can
easily extract any verified content from the
provenance storage and apply the operations which occur in the other version of the
data to check if these operations generate
the same result. This forensic enabled data
provenance model also considers the storing
of the data along with its metadata in the
provenance log.
This proposed provenance model collects
information from different layers of a cloud
architecture. It also considers necessary
measures to include location information
and other attributes required to identify the
related entities or actions of data. This large
volume of information opens enough opportunity for proper analysis.
A loose coupling between data and provenance records is maintained as provenance information is stored separately in
a database. Separation between these two
records ensure the existence of provenance
information even if the actual data is missing. By nature, provenance information is
immutable and persistent. If any provenance
is deleted from the database intentionally, a
database audit can provide necessary hints
to identify the miscreants.
The proposed model also prioritizes the
c 2018 ADFSL
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Table 1. Comparative analysis of the proposed approaches

necessity of a query and verification interface for the investigator and court authority. A well-designed interface with features
of executing customize requests to extract
required information from the provenance
database can prove the efficiency of a provenance model. Effective data visualization
is another important aspect of these interfaces. A detailed overview of an event in
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chronological order, providing information
about a file with location and list of processes that contributed in evolution of the
file can help an investigator define the legal boundary while requesting for actual artifacts from the providers without intervening other users’ information and identifying
the actual lineage of the file. A step by step
verification can also help a jury or court auPage 61
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thority to detect the possible symptoms of
collusion between the consumer and cloud
service provider, consumer and investigator,
or provider and investigator.
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